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Information Behavior and Political Preferences
KONSTANTIN VÖSSING AND TILL WEBER*
This article shows that citizens consider policy positions for the formation of their political preferences
when they actively seek and find high-quality information, while they dismiss passively acquired and
low-quality information. The study develops an extended theory of information and political preferences
that incorporates the process of information acquisition and its connection with information quality.
A novel experimental design separates the effects on political preferences due to information behavior as
an activity from those due to selective exposure to information. The study applies this design in a labora-
tory experiment with a diverse group of participants using the example of issue voting and European
integration in the context of the 2014 European Parliament elections.
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Information is a critical foundation of democratic politics. The content and amount of information
provided to citizens determine a wide range of political preferences, including judgments of issue
relevance,1 evaluations of politicians,2 vote choices3 and policy opinions.4 The manifold
mechanisms through which information shapes the formation and expression of these preferences
include information updating,5 agenda setting,6 priming,7 framing8 and persuasive appeals.9
Despite the significance of information for political preferences and a large body of
scholarship on the topic, the process through which citizens acquire political information in the
first place has attracted little scholarly attention. Does the impact of information on political
preferences depend on whether citizens are passive recipients or active seekers of information?
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Existing research on information updating, priming, agenda setting and framing merely suggests
that information needs to be disseminated and then received, while the persuasion framework10
presumes that information needs to be received and accepted to affect political preferences.
Differences in the question of information acceptance notwithstanding, prior scholarship about
information and political preferences relies on a basic model of information provision that does
not consider the process of information acquisition.
This article develops an extended model of information and political preferences by
theorizing the implications of different forms of information behavior – active information
seeking versus passive information acquisition – for the effect of information on political
preferences. The model is based on the assumption that information needs to be received,
accepted and then retained in memory in order to affect political preferences. We argue that
individuals are more likely to retain information they have actively acquired, and are more
likely to accept new information when it is of high quality. Citizens only incorporate new policy
information into their political preferences when they actively seek and find a high-quality
product. We thus expect political preferences to depend on an interaction of information
behavior and information quality.
The reliance of existing research on a basic model of information provision and the lack
of attention to information behavior is to some extent a natural side effect of randomized
experimental designs, which are prevalent in studies of political preferences. Random
assignment to political information makes it possible to determine the average treatment effects
of information exposure, but it does not allow information seeking as an activity to be
disentangled from the factors that make it more or less likely for individuals to seek political
information in the first place.
Conventional experiments are thus not equipped to determine whether an effect of
encountering information on political preferences stems from the process of seeking information
or from individual dispositions that cause selective exposure.11 This analytical impasse is also
reflected in real-world strategies of political communication and advertisement. Parties and
candidates are keenly interested in unloading as much information as possible with ever-higher
surgical accuracy onto voters, whose preferences are becoming more and more transparent. In
contrast, our theory suggests that both political scientists and political actors would be well
advised to address not only the ‘big data’-driven amount of information, but also the nuts and
bolts of the surrounding individual-level processes of seeking and finding information of
varying quality. Designing high-quality policy information, giving voters good reasons to look
for information and devising interactive ways to engage that information yields significant
effects on party preferences and voting.
To corroborate our claims with evidence, we devise an innovative experimental design that
isolates the effects of information seeking as an activity from the impact of selective exposure
and its determinants. Our experiment combines conventional random exposure to information in
an assignment condition with two additional conditions that entail active information seeking –
actual self-selection of information versus non-selection (complemented by a model of the
selection process), and steered selection, which gives all participants in this condition the (false)
impression that they are actively selecting information.
We apply our novel experimental design to the case of issue voting, which occurs when
information updating and priming increase the extent to which a specific policy issue is
considered in making vote choices. Specifically, we study the extent to which the issue of
10 McGuire 1985; Zaller 1992.
11 Case 2006; Klapper 1960; Stroud 2008.
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European integration shapes voting behavior, using a lab experiment conducted with a diverse
group of German citizens during the campaign for the European Parliament (EP) elections in
May 2014. Participants are randomly assigned to one of the three information behavior
conditions explained above. Moreover, to assess the critical function of information quality for
the connection between information behavior and political preferences, information within each
of the three conditions of information behavior is randomly provided in a high- or low-quality
version. Otherwise, the content of the information is the same across conditions, explaining two
opposing issue positions about the Europeanization of employment policy, either in favor of
European Union (EU) authority or a national approach. To create a realistic information
environment, these two positions are assigned to the four political parties represented in the
German parliament. Assignment of positions to parties is random, and implemented in such a
way that there are always two parties on either side of the issue divide. We discuss below how
this strategy is supported by the particular issue chosen for our study and how it yields high
experimental realism and generalizable conclusions about voter responses to policy information.
The article is organized as follows. First, we develop our theoretical account. We summarize
our argument and outline the basic model of information provision before theorizing the two
additional components of our extended model – information behavior and information quality.
Secondly, we describe our research design, including the experimental procedures, the leverage
gained from the issue used in the study, the selection model and the measurement of key
variables. Thirdly, we outline our data analysis and findings. Fourthly, we provide a conclusion
and discuss political, theoretical and methodological implications of our research.
AN EXTENDED MODEL OF INFORMATION AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES
Our extended model of information and political preferences relies on the study of issue voting
as an example of a process in which a political preference is affected by the provision of
information. It elaborates on the two jointly occurring mechanisms of information provision that
have previously been shown to cause increased issue voting – information updating and
priming. The model can be extrapolated to other political preferences and mechanisms of
information provision that affect political preferences, such as agenda setting, framing and
persuasion, since all these mechanisms are based on the same basic model of information
provision that excludes the process of information acquisition.
Issue voting occurs when voters express support for a political party or a candidate whose
supply of issue positions provides the greatest match with their own demand.12 Information
updating is the most fundamental prerequisite for issue voting, as it gives voters the necessary
informational input to match their own views to varying party positions,13 while the concurrent
process of priming increases the significance of the issue as a standard for political
evaluations.14 Priming information about a particular issue makes considerations related to the
issue more accessible in memory, which raises the salience of the issue and its relative weight in
vote choices.
We treat information updating and priming as concurrent mechanisms that jointly translate
information into political preferences. For this purpose we use experimental treatments that
12 The ‘directional’ model (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989) elaborates on the traditional ‘proximity’ model
(Downs 1957), but both approaches are based on the same idea that voting occurs on the basis of issue affinities.
We explain below how this is reflected in our measurement choices.
13 Lenz 2009.
14 Iyengar and Kinder 1987.
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always initiate both mechanisms by underlining the importance of an issue as well as providing
new information about party positions on the issue. This scenario enhances the realism of our
experiment in that it closely resembles real-world campaign information, which will rarely
prime an issue without saying anything about party positions or merely announce party
positions without saying anything about the issue. Irrespective of this choice, however, the two
mechanisms are theoretically distinct and can be studied separately with proper analytical
provisions.15
Receiving Information
Existing arguments about the effects of information updating and priming on issue voting rely
on the basic model of information provision. They suggest that information merely needs to be
received in order to shape political preferences. Parties and other elite actors can thus increase
the influence of a particular issue on vote choices simply by making sure that information is
effectively disseminated to its targets. For instance, in our empirical case of issue voting and
European integration, prior research has shown that vote choices are affected by a combination
of information updating and priming when citizens receive information about the issue,16 while
EU issue voting decreases when information is diluted.17 As our research is based on giving
voters information about a European integration issue, we would expect to find support for the
classic issue voting hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), according to which a match of policy
preferences between individuals and parties over the desired scope of European integration
should affect vote choice.
HYPOTHESIS 1 (Classic issue voting hypothesis): A greater match of policy preferences between
an individual and a party makes it more likely that the individual will vote for
the party.
Mediated by successfully updated information and greater issue salience, the provision of
information should increase, overall, the extent of issue voting in a diverse group of citizens.
We develop an extended model of information and political preferences by arguing that
this type of effect is essentially conditional. It depends on the acceptance and retention
of newly received information. Receiving high-quality information favors information
acceptance, which facilitates better information retention through active information seeking.
High-quality information and information seeking thus serve as critical catalysts for information
updating, increased issue salience and eventually a greater effect of information on political
preferences.18
15 See Lenz 2009. An additional explanation for a correlation between issue positions and political preferences
resulting from the provision of issue-related information is projection (Hart and Middleton 2014; Lenz 2009).
While in the case of priming and updating people adjust their preferences according to their position on the issue
concerned, the causal effect is reversed in the case of projection. Following the suggestions of Hart and
Middleton (2014) and Lenz (2009), we exclude the possibility of projection by measuring participants’ issue
positions before the administration of the information treatment.
16 De Vries et al. 2011; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011.
17 Weber 2009.
18 Our model intentionally distinguishes between scope conditions and catalysts here. The effect of infor-
mation on political preferences is conditioned on information acceptance and retention. High-quality information
favors the former, and information seeking improves the latter. However, high-quality information and infor-
mation seeking are catalysts and not scope conditions, because other factors might have similar effects on
information retention and acceptance.
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Retaining Information
As the first of two catalysts for the effect of information on political preferences, we propose
that active information behavior favors the consideration of new information by improving
information retention. The juxtaposition of the active seeking and passive acquisition of
information constitutes the most crucial distinction between different types of information
behavior.19 Selective exposure is the result of information behavior, but rather than the activity
of obtaining information, it identifies the biases in information exposure and their determinants.
For instance, individuals with lower levels of political interest or sophistication are considerably
less likely to expose themselves to political information. Selective exposure has received a lot of
theoretical and empirical attention in political science,20 while information behavior has
remained heavily undertheorized.
We argue that variation in information behavior, independent of selective exposure and its
determinants, affects political preferences by regulating the extent to which information is
retained in memory before it is considered for vote choices as well as for other preferences and
judgments. Hypothesis 2 formulates the expectation of a preliminary theory of information
behavior and political preferences (not yet incorporating the role of information quality as the
second moderating factor, which is explained below). According to this perspective, actively
seeking information, as opposed to passive acquisition, should increase the extent to which
individuals retain the information in memory, prompting them to consider the issue covered in
the information more strongly for their vote choices and other political preferences.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (Preliminary information-seeking hypothesis): If individuals actively seek (and
find) information, the process of doing so makes them develop their political
preferences more strongly on the basis of the issue covered in the information.
Prior research has demonstrated that active information seeking is superior to passive
acquisition for effective information retention in many different learning tasks, such as learning
languages21 or computer software.22 While the motivations and abilities that guide general
learning only partly overlap with those that guide the engagement of political information, the
cognitive process of encountering policy information, retaining it in memory and using it
(or not) for political preferences such as vote choices is equivalent to other tasks involving
information retention. Active information behavior should thus improve not only information
retention in various learning tasks, but also the extent to which individuals retain political
information.
The volitional control afforded by active information behavior offers a wide range of benefits
for information retention, including the ability to select the most relevant content from a pool of
information.23 However, even when that option is unavailable, as in our study, just the ability to
make decisions about retrieving information24 and the ensuing intervention25 increase learning
success. Markant et al. show that even the most minimal degree of intervention (pushing a
button to continue a test) is sufficient to improve the retention of information.26 Decision and
19 Bates 2002; Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1956; Case 2007; Harman, Humphrey, and Goodale 1999;
Johnson 1997; Markant and Gureckis 2013.
20 Kinder 2003; Klapper 1960; Stroud 2008; Sunstein 2001; Zaller 1992.
21 Atkinson 1972.
22 Bell and Kozlowski 2008.
23 Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1956.
24 Leotti, Iyengar, and Oshsner 2010.
25 Sobel and Kushnir 2006.
26 Markant et al. 2014.
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intervention enhance information retention by facilitating better coordination of information
exposure and engagement,27 and by sustaining causal exploration as a particularly effective
mode of information processing.28 According to a preliminary theory of information behavior,
once actively seeking information has improved information retention, the ensuing information
updating in conjunction with an increase in the accessibility of the information and the salience
of the issue should ultimately yield a greater weight of the issue in the formation of political
preferences, evidenced in our case by more extensive issue voting.
Accepting Information
We now elaborate further on the preliminary theory of information behavior by introducing
information acceptance as a second scope condition for the effect of information on political
preferences and by arguing that high-quality information functions as a catalyst for information
acceptance. We thus propose that the entire causal process that unfolds from active information
behavior to information retention, and eventually an increased weight of the information in the
formation of political preferences, depends on whether citizens first accept the information they
encounter. In research on persuasion, accepting information29 or ‘yielding’ to it,30 after it has
been received, is a prerequisite for attitude change. We argue that information acceptance
conditions the effect of information not only on policy attitudes but also on other types of
political preferences, for instance party choices in a process of issue voting.
We expect higher-quality information to increase the likelihood of information acceptance
and thereby to facilitate the effect of information seeking on information retention and the
subsequent increase in the impact of information on political preferences. Our argument builds
on the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) of preference formation.31 The ELM suggests that
individuals need to be motivated to engage in systematic information processing (‘central
route’) instead of relying on heuristic shortcuts (‘peripheral route’). The ELM further suggests
that motivated individuals who do process information will only accept incoming information
when it is of sufficiently high quality.
We argue that the very process of active information seeking, as one of several possible
triggers, raises people’s motivation to process information. The motivation generated by the
process of information seeking then needs to be ‘rewarded’: seeking information implies the
expectation of finding a high-quality result. If this expectation is fulfilled, the information is
accepted, and the acceptance and retention of information interactively affect political preferences.
Finding low-quality information, by contrast, should lead to frustration and prevent an effect of
information on preferences by prompting individuals to dismiss the information. High-quality
information should thus support the connection between active information behavior and a greater
impact of information on political preferences by facilitating information acceptance for all active
information seekers.
The expectation of an interaction between information seeking and information acceptance is
also sustained by studies of cognition and learning. This research demonstrates that the positive
effect of active information behavior on information retention depends on various moderating
factors, including the quality of learning materials.32 Active learners need to encounter
27 Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1956; Harman, Humphrey, and Goodale 1999; Markant et al. 2014.
28 Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1956; Markant and Gureckis 2013; Sobel and Kushnir 2006.
29 Zaller 1992.
30 McGuire 1985.
31 Petty and Cacioppo 1986.
32 See, for example, Atkinson 1972; Paas, Renkl, and Sweller 2004.
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adequately designed instructional materials to achieve improved information retention, just as
active seekers of policy information need to find high-quality information products. The
expectation of an interaction between information behavior and information quality in the
formation of political preferences is thus supported by two distinct scholarly traditions. It is
summarized by our Hypothesis 3, which completes our extended model of information and
political preferences.
HYPOTHESIS 3 (Information quality and information-seeking hypothesis): The higher the quality
of political information, the more the very process of seeking (and finding)
information reinforces the connection between information, issue considerations
and political preferences.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We test our theoretical expectations using an experimental design (illustrated in Figure 1)
that manipulates information behavior and information quality.33 The administration of the
treatments builds on popular voter advice applications (VAAs) that allow citizens to access
information about the policy proposals of political parties and compare them to their own
preferences to inform their vote choice. Participants are exposed to a reproduction of the official
website of the German VAA for the EP elections of 2014, which is administered by the
reputable Federal Agency for Civic and Political Education (bpb). This particular channel is
merely a convenient strategy to communicate our cover story, according to which we are
interested in the use of new technologies for political communication. Conveniently, the bpb
and VAAs in general have an excellent reputation. Recent studies show that VAAs are
perceived as useful and trustworthy tools that affect voting behavior in the real world, even after
controlling for self-selection bias.34
But VAAs are not of substantive interest to our research, and participants do not actually get
to use a VAA in the experiment. They first read a brief mock article, devoid of political content,
explaining the purpose of VAA technology. The policy information is contained in a second
article allegedly designed to illustrate the procedure through which party positions are funneled
into the application. This second article states that the people in charge of the VAA explore the
policy statements parties disseminate for the upcoming EP elections. The article then explains
that party positions are assigned to different thematic fields, so that users can identify the match
between their own preferences and the positions of all major German political parties for a wide
range of issues.
The text next illustrates the operating procedures of the VAA by discussing the issue of the
Europeanization of employment policy, allegedly as an example. The two possible positions
here are Europeanization (giving the EU more authority to fight unemployment) or the
continued pursuit of a national approach (leaving competences and financial resources at the
national political level). Each participant who receives the treatment is confronted with both
policy positions. In the treatment article, the two opposing positions are randomly assigned to
the four parties represented in the German parliament: the Christian democratic CDU/CSU, the
33 We produced an online appendix, available at dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/BJPolS, which reports
information on experimental protocols and treatments as well as complementary statistical analyses. In keeping
with the standards of transparency and accuracy endorsed by the Open Science Framework, we have reported, to
the best of our knowledge and abilities, all measures, conditions, sampling and recruitment procedures, data
analysis procedures and experimental protocols pertaining to this research.
34 Alvarez et al. 2014; Vassil 2011.
Information Behavior and Political Preferences 539
social democratic SPD, the eco-libertarian Greens and the socialist Left Party. Randomization
avoids any distortive association of policy positions with the popularity of these parties in our
sample, and – as discussed in the following section – it is plausible for the issue at hand. The
procedure is conducted in such a way that there are always two parties – any two parties – on
either side of the issue, thereby producing six different constellations of party conflict. To
exclude the possibility of confounds through ordering effects, we also randomized the order in
which the two parties assigned to the same issue position appear in the article.
To trigger different forms of information behavior, participants are randomly assigned to one
of three modes of information provision after having read the apolitical first article. Participants
directed into the assignment condition are randomly assigned to either receive the second article
containing the policy information or to proceed directly with the questionnaire. This condition
thus entails passive information acquisition, which is the typical mode of operation in existing
research about the impact of various mechanisms of information provision on political
preferences (as outlined in the introduction).
Using different techniques, the self-selection and steered selection conditions both trigger
information seeking as a generic form of information behavior rather than prompting
individuals to find specific and narrowly defined information. In the self-selection condition,
participants are given the option to read the second article containing our policy information or
to proceed without reading it. Opting for the information implies active seeking, while the non-
seeking participants in this category choose to avoid the information. Echoing an argument of
Gaines and Kuklinski, the self-selection condition thus incorporates active treatment selection
into the experimental design, similar to the work of Arceneaux and Johnson as well as
Druckman, Fein and Leeper, but for a different explanatory purpose and combined with a model
of the selection process.35 We trigger the generic process of information seeking and enhance
Assignment
1
2
3
Self-
selection
Steered
selection Information
No information
Information
No information
Information
Participants
High information quality
Low information quality
High information quality
Low information quality
High information quality
Low information quality
Participants Information behavior treatment
1 = passive information acquisition
2 and 3 = active information seeking
Information quality treatment
Fig. 1. Experimental design
35 Arceneaux and Johnson 2013; Druckman, Fein, and Leeper 2012; Gaines and Kuklinski 2011.
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the realism of our design by phrasing the selection option in terms of a discussion of new
debates in the 2014 EP elections, rather than telling participants to specifically look for
information about party positions.
In the steered selection condition, active information seeking is induced for all participants
who were randomly assigned to this category. Rather than allowing participants to opt out of the
information, they are allegedly given a choice between two different articles, introduced to them
as discussing either the political debates informing the VAA or the technology behind it.
However, irrespective of their choices, all participants receive the same article containing our
policy information that is also used in the other conditions. We phrased the article so that its
content appears plausible both as a technical and a political text.36 In the steered selection
condition, information seeking is thus induced by giving participants the impression of actively
selecting between different types of information. This strategy avoids the composition effects
that are inevitably present in the self-selection condition.
Prior experimental research on cognition and learning uses ‘yoked designs’ to simulate the
distinction between active information seeking and passive information acquisition.37 In this type
of experiment, participants perform a learning task, either as self-directed learners allowed to
make their own learning choices or as ‘yoked’ learners, who receive the exact same sequence of
information as one of their active counterparts without having any control over the process of
information acquisition. This design holds the content of the information constant between active
seekers and passive information recipients, but it may be less effective at isolating the role of
information behavior. It is possible that passive information recipients in ‘yoked designs’ are at a
disadvantage compared to active learners not because of the hypothesized benefits of information
seeking, but rather due to being exposed to a sequence of information that comes straight from the
mind of a different individual, which has not been created for the purpose of effective instruction
or information provision. Our experimental design avoids this pitfall of yoked designs by
implementing other ways of inducing active versus passive information acquisition. Moreover,
yoked designs are not concerned with the broader problem of self-selection into the information,
which we address by combining random assignment with a self-selection component.
To test the effects of the interaction between information behavior and information quality,
all participants who receive information in one way or another are randomly assigned to receive
it in either a high- or low-quality version. The broader debate about the quality of information
and argumentation is eclectic and controversial, with contributions from a wide range of
disciplines. However, for information about the policy positions of political actors investigated
in our study, prior research suggests more unanimously that the quality of information depends
primarily on the sophistication of the justification that is provided for varying policy positions.38
Following this literature, high quality in our treatment is expressed through a more plausible
and sophisticated justification of different positions. According to Areni and Lutz, more
plausible and sophisticated justifications of party positions increase the quality of information
by making it appear more likely that the measure for which parties express support (in our case,
Europeanization or national control) will indeed advance the envisioned goal (in our case,
employment).39 Empirical studies about the quality of deliberative democracy,40 as well as
36 See the online appendix for reproductions and English translations of the instructions and the treatment
article.
37 Harman, Humphrey, and Goodale 1999; Markant et al. 2014; Voss et al. 2011.
38 Areni and Lutz 1988; Broockman and Butler 2015; McGraw 1990, 1991; McGraw et al. 1993; Steenbergen
et al. 2003.
39 Areni and Lutz 1988.
40 For example, Steenbergen et al. 2003.
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research about elite influence on public opinion,41 come to the same conclusion – that more
sophisticated justifications of a political view are a key feature of high-quality information.42
Data collection for the experiment was conducted during the last two weeks of February
and the first two weeks of May 2014. The study was implemented in the experimental
laboratory at the Institute of Social and Political Sciences at Humboldt University Berlin with a
diverse group of 342 participants who reflect the variation in key socio-demographic features of
the German electorate. The sample covers the age range of eighteen to seventy-eight, both
genders (55 per cent female), all education levels from grade school dropouts to PhDs, as well
as diverse income situations such as students, interns, employees, freelancers, homemakers,
pensioners and work seekers. Conducting the experiment with a diverse group of participants in
a laboratory environment supports the effective combination of internal and external validity in
our study.
Of the 342 participants, 165 were students recruited from a participant pool database, who
received course credit or a small honorarium for participating in the study. The remaining
177 participants were recruited through a database of a wide range of different clubs and
associations as well as classified ads.43 They received a compensation of 15 euros. Completing
the experiment took around twenty minutes, informed consent was solicited before the
beginning of the study, and the protection of participants, including appropriate debriefing, was
guaranteed according to the guidelines prescribed by a typical Institutional Review Board
(IRB).44 Portrayed as research about the use of digital technologies for political communication,
the study was conducted on individual computer stations in the experimental lab. After
providing informed consent, participants answered a series of pre-treatment questions, went
through the experimental procedure and then responded to manipulation checks, measures of
our dependent variable and other post-treatment items. All survey questions that could possibly
have been affected by the treatment (in particular participants’ policy views and party
identifications) were placed in the pre-treatment stage. The large sample size allows us to divide
participants into the eight conditions (defined by mode of information acquisition and
information quality) while retaining statistical power. The online appendix contains a frequency
table, which also shows that the distribution of student and other participants is roughly equal
across conditions.
VIRTUES OF THE MANIPULATED ISSUE
We selected the discussion about the Europeanization of employment policy as the exemplary
issue used in this study because it represents a meaningful, important and controversial issue,
which at the same time lends itself perfectly to our manipulation, as one rare issue for which all
six possible combinations of parties and issue positions are feasible and plausible. This is the
41 Broockman and Butler 2015; McGraw 1990, 1991; McGraw et al. 1993.
42 Note that the high-quality version of our treatment is also longer than the low-quality version. We discuss
below why information quality (rather than length) is the critical factor in our study.
43 One might suspect inflated treatment effects in the student sample because young people have less-
developed political identities. However, the opposite effect occurs in our data, indicating that students may well
be less settled, while their cognitive resources make them more critical when accepting or rejecting information
in the first place (see Zaller 1992). The inclusion of the student sample is thus a conservative move. Excluding it
and relying on the more diverse sample of other participants alone would produce even stronger support for all
hypotheses.
44 We used the procedures published by the IRB at Ohio State University as our frame of refer
orrp.osu.edu/irb/.
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case, to begin with, because employment as a political goal is unequivocally shared by German
parties and voters, so that the controversy portrayed in the treatment article revolves exclusively
around the scope of EU authority over employment policy. In other words, the question is not
about the importance of creating new jobs but about the best way to do this. European
integration, in turn, is a typical ‘cross-cutting’ issue. While the political left thinks of the EU as
a vehicle for cross-border regulation, the political right sees integration as an opportunity to
liberalize national markets.45 As both sides are aware of the double-edged blade, each party
harbors considerable internal conflict and pronounced within-party variation of preferences over
the issue.46 In addition, overall positions show relatively little variation across parties.47
Moreover, parties that are not explicitly founded on mobilizing anti-EU sentiments (and none
of the four included parties are) avoid distinct positions and direct confrontation over integration
policies.48 EP elections are essentially ‘second-order’ contests fought over national issues rather
than questions of integration.49 The particular features of the issue and the party behavior it
entails are reflected in public opinion: voters have distinct preferences of their own, but they are
highly uncertain about party positions toward European integration. In an EU-wide survey
study,50 40 per cent of voters were unable to place parties on an issue scale about a European
employment program, and among those who did respond, agreement of the perceived positions
was less than half of what it is for left–right positions. A similar pattern was found for general
positions toward integration.51 Even in countries where the EU is heavily contested at the elite
level, such as the UK, perceptions of competing party positions can be manipulated
experimentally.52 Overall, European employment policy lends itself to our manipulation
because it is a salient issue, which is at the same time not described by entrenched party
positions.53
Using the debate about the Europeanization of employment policy in our study also allows us
to draw generalizable conclusions about voter reactions to policy information that extend to
political issues at large. This is the case because the unique features of the issue facilitate a high
degree of experimental realism, that is, congruence between the real-world political processes
we are investigating and the processes occurring within the experiment. In the context of our
research, experimental realism requires a real issue (the debate about the Europeanization of
employment policy) that speaks to real voter preferences (about the scope of European
integration), rather than a hypothetical scenario or an uncontroversial topic that participants
would easily dismiss. Moreover, experimental realism is also favored by the particular qualities
45 Hooghe and Marks 1999.
46 Hix and Lord 1997.
47 The 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey of national parties and the EU contains an item concerning European
employment policy. On the seven-point scale, the standard deviation of the parties included in our experiment is
a mere 0.64. The standard deviation of the closest equivalent in the 2014 Survey (EU authority over economic
and budgetary policies) is somewhat higher but still limited (1.16).
48 Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004.
49 Reif and Schmitt 1980.
50 Van der Brug and Van der Eijk 1999.
51 Weber 2007.
52 Tilley and Wlezien 2008.
53 Empirical analysis supports our claim that there is no systematic relationship between political parties and
preferences over the proper polity level for fighting unemployment. Correlations between individual party
identification and opinions about the Europeanization of employment policy are clearly non-significant (p> 0.1)
for all included parties (r=−0.11 for CDU, 0.004 for SPD, 0.11 for Left Party, and 0.13 for Greens). Of course,
the participants of our study may still have rudimentary pre-existing beliefs regarding party positions on
European employment policy. To the degree that this is the case, it will be harder to find an effect of our
randomized treatment.
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of the issue at the elite level (vague party positions, low variation between them and pronounced
within-party conflict), because they allow us to randomly assign clear positions to parties in the
experiment, which would be impossible for an issue with party positions that are already clear in
the real world. This makes it possible to simulate a real-world situation in which parties take
clear positions (which reflects the typical political issue to which we want to extrapolate our
findings), while at the same time excluding all party-specific effects through the random
assignment of parties to different positions.
SELECTION MODEL
Introducing active treatment selection into our experiment makes mechanisms of information
behavior accessible to experimental scrutiny that are usually reserved for observational research.
However, the option of self-selecting information triggers not only different types of
information behavior. It also introduces selective exposure to information as a potential
confounder reflected by the difference in composition between individuals who are disposed to
actively seek information and others who are disposed to avoid it. It is thus possible that a
positive finding regarding information seeking would only reflect characteristics of self-selected
seekers that have nothing to do with the mechanism underlying our hypothesis. To identify this
composition effect and separate it from the proper effect of information seeking itself, we
estimate a statistical model of the self-selection decision and construct a propensity-score
weight (PSW) on the basis of the model’s predictions. This is a standardized statistical
procedure developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin as well as Imbens54 with straightforward
implementation:
a) In a first step, probit regression is used to estimate the binary choice between avoiding (0)
and seeking (1) information for the 139 participants in the self-selection condition. Table 1
shows the estimation results (predictor variables are discussed below).
b) For each individual, the model predicts the probability P that a participant with this
particular set of covariate values would choose to seek information.
c) The PSW is then calculated as 1/P for participants who sought information, and as 1/(1 −P)
for those who avoided it. (The other conditions – assigned information and steered selection –
receive the default value of 1.)
d) To correct for the difference in composition in the self-selection condition, the PSW will be
applied to weight cases in three models (4, 7 and 8 in Table 2) of the treatment effect of
policy information on party preferences.
Models of information seeking in the real world can be very comprehensive.55 In our study we
expect that composition effects will be relatively minor, and their determinants less numerous
compared to observational data. This is because our experiment controls almost all
circumstances of the self-selection situation and its immediate history – except, of course,
the ultimate decision to seek or avoid the information. Predictors of this choice were chosen for
two complementary reasons. The first group includes typical determinants of information
exposure: experimental session, party ID, opinion leadership, need for cognition, political
54 Imbens 2000; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983. The PSW approach is particularly helpful for our aim of
modeling a phenomenon that essentially represents the relationship of two variables (policy match and vote
propensities). If the phenomenon of interest were simply the level of one variable, we could use control variables
directly in the outcome equation.
55 For example, Case 2007; Johnson 1997.
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sophistication and – as the choice was framed in the context of EP elections – interest in
European politics, attitudes toward European integration and subjective salience of integration
policy. Predictors in the second group were chosen on the basis of likely correlations with the
treatment effect. As the information presents party positions on labor market policy, we
included subjective salience of labor market policy, left–right position, social class, education
and training, and occupation. See the online appendix for measurement details.
As shown in Table 1, the performance of the model constructed from these variables is highly
satisfactory; 80 per cent of the cases are correctly classified as seeking or avoiding information,
respectively. Notwithstanding this result, however, it is important to point out that no statistical
estimate is perfect. The introduction of active selection into our experiment leaves some
uncertainty as to potential composition effects not captured by our model. This is the reason
why we also included ‘steered selection’ as an alternative way of testing the effect of
TABLE 1 Probit Estimates for the Selection Model
Marginal effects Standard errors
Session mean (de-selfed) 0.15 (0.20)
Party ID (baseline: none)
CDU/CSU −0.25+ (0.14)
SPD −0.28** (0.11)
LINKE −0.37* (0.15)
GRÜNE −0.19+ (0.11)
Other −0.18 (0.13)
Opinion leadership −0.06 (0.26)
Need for cognition 0.35* (0.16)
Political sophistication −0.11 (0.17)
EU interest −0.48 (0.31)
EU support 0.97** (0.32)
EU salience −0.47* (0.22)
Job market salience 0.04 (0.15)
Left-right position −0.02 (0.02)
Left-right position: extremism 0.03 (0.03)
Class (baseline: working class)
Lower middle class 0.11 (0.15)
Middle class 0.17* (0.08)
Upper middle class 0.18+ (0.11)
High school graduate −0.16* (0.06)
Qualification (baseline: none)
Vocational 0.16 (0.11)
Academic 0.16 (0.11)
Occupation (baseline: retired)
Unemployed −0.05 (0.18)
Student 0.26* (0.12)
Self-employed 0.15 (0.16)
Employed: academic 0.22 (0.14)
Employed: vocational 0.02 (0.14)
N 139
Nagelkerke’s R-squared 0.332
Per cent correctly classified 80
Note: marginal effects on Pr(Y= 1); estimated at means for continuous variables
and as first differences for categorical variables. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered by session. +p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01
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information seeking. As explained above, all participants in this condition receive the same
policy information while they believe they are actively selecting it. The advantage of steered
selection is that no composition effects can occur. The advantage of self-selection is its realistic
opt-out possibility. By triangulating these two strategies, we aim to maximize the robustness of
our analysis.
MEASUREMENT
Our main dependent variable is a measure of party preference called ‘propensities to vote’
(PTVs), which asks participants to indicate the propensity on eleven-point scales that they ‘will
ever vote for’ each of the four included parties. The PTV battery is a long-standing survey
instrument that has been included in numerous national and international election studies. The
question is explicitly designed to measure the generalized electoral utility a voter derives from
supporting a party; it is closely linked to vote choice, and it accommodates differentiated
preferences.56 It thus lends itself to our purpose of testing reactions to an experimental
manipulation of issue positions in multiparty systems.
PTVs are recorded for each of the four parties, so that the resulting dataset has a multilevel
(‘stacked’) structure, including party per participant at the lowest level, followed by the
participant and eventually the party constellation. To control for the fact that the observations
within participant and party constellation are not independent, we use random intercept models
at the level of participants and robust standard errors clustered by party constellation.57 We also
control for individual levels of identification with the four included parties using a set
of ‘thermometer’ questions. They ask participants to indicate on 0–100 scales how ‘cold’ or
‘warm’ they feel toward each party, with higher values representing greater levels of
identification.
To model the effect of the policy treatment on the PTVs, the stacked structure of our data is
key. As explained, each participant is represented by four rows in the dataset, one for each
party, and the treatment positions were randomly assigned to parties. The expected correlation
of the assigned party positions with the PTVs is thus zero, because whether a certain position
has a positive or negative effect on a certain respondent’s party preference depends on that
respondent’s own policy position. We thus model the extent of issue voting with a ‘policy
match’ variable. The stacked data structure allows us to create this variable according
to the match between the participant’s attitude toward the scope of European integration
and each of the randomly assigned party positions. Importantly, participant attitudes were
measured before the treatment, so that competing explanations that bedevil observational
studies of issue voting (in particular persuasion, cue taking from parties and rationalization) can
be excluded.
Specifically, participants answered a battery of questions asking for each of twelve
policy fields whether decisions in that field should be ‘rather made by one’s home country’ or
‘rather made by the EU’.58 A preference for EU competence in all twelve fields is coded
56 Van der Eijk et al. 2006.
57 Fixed effects were not deemed necessary as they produced virtually identical results.
58 The policy fields are immigration, unemployment, environment, fiscal policy, defense, media, health,
science, education, labor law, foreign policy and internal security. We found a composite score to be more
reliable than a single employment item that would be a more direct equivalent of the party positions in the
treatment article. This reflects deliberate design choices: respondent position was asked before the treatment
raised awareness of the employment issue, thus avoiding reverse causality, and it was included in a low-stimulus
issue battery to avoid attracting undue attention before the manipulation. Besides these technical matters, the
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as 0.5, a preference for national competence in all fields as −0.5. All other combinations are
located on a linear scale connecting the two extremes, with a neutral zero point in the middle.
These scores are then multiplied by the assigned party positions, coded 1 for the European
approach to employment policy and −1 for the national approach. If the participant and party
agree on the policy direction, the resulting variable thus takes on a positive value and increases
with the participant’s attitude score. If the participant and party favor opposite directions, the
resulting variable takes on a negative value and decreases with the subject’s score.59 The policy
match variable ranges from −0.5 to 0.5.60
ANALYSIS
As an abiding background condition for any investigation of voting behavior, we expect vote
propensities to be affected by separate measures of party identification. Testing this expectation
serves to establish the general ecological validity of our data, which reflects the reactions of real
voters to real party positions. Moreover, party identification as an observational variable will be
important as a baseline for all following experimental tests. Since we apply a post-test only
design, controlling for an established determinant of party preferences (which is measured pre-
treatment) allows us to minimize the natural variance of the dependent variable as well as any
residual imbalance of the treatment that is not eliminated by random assignment. This strategy
thus allows us to approximate a pre-post-test design while avoiding the undesired effects of
asking the same question twice. Model 1 in Table 2 shows how 0–100 thermometer scores of
party identifications are related to the 1–11 scale of the PTVs, our dependent variable. A one-
point increase on the thermometer raises the PTV by 0.12 points, a directly proportional
translation.61
Model 2 tests the classic issue voting hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) using the Policy Match
variable, which measures, as explained above, the extent to which a participant’s preference
regarding the scope of European integration matches the corresponding policy position
randomly assigned to each party, on a scale from −0.5 (perfect mismatch) to 0.5 (perfect match).
As shown in Model 2, policy match produces a maximum difference on the PTV scale slightly
above half a point. This is no overly dramatic effect, but it is of the same order of magnitude
as reported in observational studies of integration issues and party preferences.62 The classic
dictum of ‘second-order elections’ theory that European integration does not affect preferences
(F’note continued)
treatment also seems to activate more general pro/anti integration considerations. In fact, the justifications used
for the two positions could equally be used for a range of other issues; they are not specific to unemployment.
Accordingly, we found that using a general integration scale to derive respondent positions (the ‘Euro-
dynamometer’, a seven-point scale measuring the desired speed of European integration, originally from the
Eurobarometer surveys) yields very similar results to those of our issue summary. However, a ‘feeling thermo-
meter’ scale for the EU does not show any effects. Responses to our treatment are thus somewhat generalized in
terms of policy, but not as highly generalized as affective polity evaluations.
59 Our operationalization of policy match is thus compatible with both the traditional ‘proximity’ model of
issue voting (Downs 1957) and the ‘directional’ model (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989), which was shown to
be particularly appropriate for the issue of European integration (Dinas and Pardos-Prado 2012).
60 Participants who did not acquire the information are coded as 0 on the Policy Match variable. This is the
exact middle between a positive and a negative match, and represents the expectation of a neutral (zero-size)
effect. Exclusion of these cases yields virtually identical results.
61 Given that party ID is the only observational covariate in Table 2, its coefficient does not change in the
visible digits across models.
62 Van der Brug, Franklin, and Tóka 2008; Weber 2009.
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for national parties63 still receives a lot of support. At the same time, voters appear to be able to
formulate opinions on integration issues and relate them systematically to revealed party
positions in response to issue-related information. The significant effect of Policy Match in
Model 2 also shows that our experimental treatment has the expected impact in the full sample
of participants irrespective of information quality and information behavior, and even when
individual levels of partisanship are controlled.
Models 3 to 8 (shown in Table 2) test the expectations generated by our extended theoretical
model of information and political preferences. Models 3 and 4 test a preliminary information
behavior hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), while Models 5–8 evaluate our key hypothesis (Hypothesis 3)
about the interaction between information behavior and information quality. Models 4, 7 and 8 are
estimated using the PSW, so that the covariates that predict information seeking shown in
Table 1 are balanced across different modes of information acquisition. If our selection model is
adequate, any remaining differences between the groups in the weighted regressions of these
models can therefore be interpreted independently of composition effects resulting from
selective exposure.
To begin with, Models 3 and 4 demonstrate that a preliminary information behavior hypothesis
positing the general superiority of active information seeking over passive information acquisition
cannot be sustained. Both models, equivalent to Model 2, investigate issue voting, which occurs to
the extent that there is a positive association between policy match and vote propensities. However,
in contrast to Model 2, which estimates the effect of Policy Match for the entire sample, Models 3
and 4 estimate separate coefficients for Policy Match according to our three modes of information
provision (using a continuous-by-categorical interaction). This allows us to make inferences about
the extent to which issue voting depends on information behavior, as the random assignment
condition involves passive information acquisition, while the two remaining categories of self-
selection and steered selection represent different approaches to capturing active information seeking.
The preliminary information behavior hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) suggests that the very
process of seeking information (independently of the characteristics that determine selective
exposure and make participants more likely to seek information) should increase information
retention and issue voting. Model 3 finds the expected, yet statistically non-significant, increase
in the effects of Policy Match on voting for active information seeking in both the self-selection
and steered selection categories. Including the PSW in Model 4 further raises the value of the
Policy Match coefficient in the self-selection group from 0.62 to 0.86, but the effect remains
non-significant. Both models thus provide evidence that points in the direction predicted by
a preliminary information behavior hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), yet below conventional levels
of statistical significance. As a result, there is no sufficient basis to conclude that active
information seeking leads to increased information retention and greater issue voting
independent of the quality of the policy information voters are exposed to. Research on
learning has shown that the superiority of information seeking for information retention depends
on various contingencies in the domain of general learning (see above), and we show here that
the same is true for the retention of policy information and the subsequent use of that
information in vote choices.
Models 5 to 8 demonstrate that the superiority of information seeking in fostering increased
information retention and issue voting depends on the quality of the information voters find.
Our Hypothesis 3 formulated the expectation that higher information quality increases the
extent to which voters use the acquired information for their vote choices. By estimating the
coefficients of Policy Match separately for the three modes of information provision, Models 5
63 Reif and Schmitt 1980.
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TABLE 2 Linear Estimates for the Treatment Models
Model
Dependent variable: propensities
to vote (PTV)
(1)
Non-experimental
baseline
(2)
Global experimental
effect
(3)
By acquisition
mode
(4)
With propensity
score weight (PSW)
(5)
Low information
quality
(6)
High information
quality
(7)
Low information
quality + PSW
(8)
High information
quality + PSW
Party ID (baseline) 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Policy match with party (treatment variable) 0.54+
(0.31)
Policy match for random assignmenti 0.17 0.17 0.59 − 0.40 0.59 − 0.41
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.72) (0.47) (0.72)
Policy match for self-selectioni 0.62 0.86 0.52 0.91 0.62 1.42*
(0.45) (0.56) (0.44) (0.59) (0.58) (0.70)
Policy match for steered selectioni 0.89 0.89 0.58 1.60** 0.59 1.59**
(0.58) (0.58) (0.71) (0.47) (0.71) (0.48)
Constant 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.18* 0.14 0.29**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.05)
Observations 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368 964 812 964 812
Std dev random intercept (respondent level, N= 342) 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.99 0.94 0.92 0.85
Std dev residual 1.53 1.52 1.52 1.50 1.48 1.58 1.47 1.53
AIC 5,368 5,364 5,365 7,745 3,748 3,241 5,799 5,296
BIC 5,389 5,390 5,396 7,777 3,777 3,269 5,828 5,324
Note: HLM coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by party constellation. +p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01
iInteraction terms of the mode of information acquisition (a multinomial variable) with policy match (a continuous variable). For simplicity, the constitutive terms of
acquisition mode were omitted. They are clearly insignificant and do not affect any visible digits of other estimates.
to 8 also make it possible to assess the extent of issue voting for different types of information
behavior. However, in contrast to Models 3 and 4, which tested the preliminary information
behavior hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), Models 5 to 8 depict the interaction between information
seeking and information quality by estimating the contingent effects of Policy Match separately
for high (Models 6 and 8) and low (Models 5 and 7) quality.64
When the quality of the acquired information is low, the policy match between parties and
individuals has no discernible impact on vote propensities, irrespective of whether voters
actively seek the information or acquire it passively. This is demonstrated by Model 5, in which
the coefficients for Policy Match are statistically non-significant in both categories identifying
active information behavior, self-selection and steered selection. The conclusion remains the
same when the model is estimated while applying the PSW in Model 7. The coefficient for
Policy Match in the self-selection category increases slightly from 0.52 to 0.62. But still, when
information quality is low, even controlling for selective exposure and individual propensities to
opt into information through the PSW does not produce significant coefficients for the Policy
Match variable in the active information seeking conditions. Figure 2 visualizes the effects and
their confidence intervals, showing that information acquisition mode does not play a role for
participants who read low-quality information (the dark gray bars).
By contrast, when the quality of policy information is high, voters actively seeking
information, who are assembled in the self-selection and steered selection categories, are
strongly affected by the stimulus, while voters who passively acquire the information, in the
random assignment condition, still appear to dismiss it. To come to this conclusion, Model 6
tests the effects of Policy Match contingent on information behavior for those participants
exposed to high-quality information, and Model 8 adds the PSW to exclude the effects
of selective exposure in the self-selection category. As predicted by Hypothesis 3, the policy
match between party and voter has a significant effect on vote propensities for active seekers
(in Model 8; Model 6 addressed below), yet no effect for passive information recipients.65
These differences are visualized by the light gray bars in Figure 2. As indicated by the
positive coefficients of Policy Match for both the self-selection and steered selection categories,
active seeking is conducive to information retention and issue voting, while passive information
acquisition is not.66
The role of selective exposure in our argument becomes clear when comparing Models 6
and 8. When selective exposure and individual inclinations to opt into information are not taken
into account through the PSW, the Policy Match coefficient for the self-selection category
becomes non-significant in Model 6 (even if the coefficient is still positive and larger than for
64 An alternative strategy is to add multiplicative interaction terms with information quality to Models 3 and 4.
While this is mathematically identical to splitting the sample by information quality, we believe that the
presentation of separate models is clearer. A table with the full interactive specification is in the online appendix.
The statistical significance of differences between the models will be evaluated in Figure 2 below. The untreated
groups (i.e., respondents who did not receive policy information and were therefore coded 0 on Policy Match:
see note 15 above) are used for both low and high information quality (i.e., in Models 5–8).
65 Note that the high-quality treatment was only used in the second run of the experiment, which is closer to
the EP elections than the first run. The low-quality treatment still fails to produce effects in the second run,
indicating that the decisive variable is indeed information quality, not campaign context.
66 The effects of high-quality information in Figure 2 are significantly larger than 0, but not significantly larger
than the effects of low-quality information, as required by Hypothesis 3. However, this is essentially an artifact of
the aggressive strategy of splitting the sample into eight conditions. When self-selection and steered selection are
pooled, the difference between high and low information quality is highly significant (p< 0.01). We deem
this sufficient because self-selection and steered selection are different technical implementations of the same
concept, namely information seeking. Their empirical effects are also almost identical.
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low information quality in the corresponding Model 5). This is because individuals who
actively seek information are also better prepared to resist new policy information on the basis
of their predispositions.67 When controlling for this composition effect, as in Model 8, it
becomes apparent that even latently skeptical voters are affected by the very process of
information seeking. The evidence generated by the contrast between Models 6 and 8 on the one
hand, and Models 5 and 7 on the other strongly supports Hypothesis 3. Active information
seeking significantly increases the extent to which individuals rely on policy information to cast
their vote, as long as the information they encounter is of sufficient quality.
Modeling the Process
Having found support for the hypotheses generated by our extended theory of information and
political preferences, we ran several tests to model the underlying process.
First, we conducted a manipulation check to assess whether variation in information quality
was indeed perceived as expected by asking participants how informative they found the text
into which the treatment was embedded. The results show that the high-quality version was
perceived as more informative.68
Secondly, there is evidence that actively seeking participants who find high-quality
information indeed assign a higher level of salience to the European integration issue.69 This
finding is consistent with the priming expectation that information provision about an issue will
raise the salience of the issue as a standard of preference formation by making considerations
related to the issue more accessible in memory.
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Fig. 2. Effects of policy match on voting propensities by information quality and acquisition mode
67 Zaller 1992.
68 On a five-point scale with a standard deviation of 0.85, scores were 0.23 higher for the high-quality version
(p< 0.05; demographics from Table 1 balanced). This may not seem overly strong, but it is remarkable given that
the manipulation concerned only a minor part of the overall text to be evaluated in this particular question. Our
proper dependent variable, by contrast, refers to the policy positions only and may thus show stronger effects
than the manipulation check.
69 The increase in salience was tested by modeling the probability of participating in EP elections, which was
measured post-treatment on an eleven-point scale. For information-seeking individuals with high-quality
information, the probability was significantly increased by 0.8 points. Importantly, the regression controlled for
the probabilities of participating in three other types of elections (federal, regional, local); therefore this finding
can be interpreted as an increase of salience of the European issue in particular.
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Thirdly, another process test shows that actively seeking individuals who find high-quality
information indeed engage in greater processing effort when making judgments about their
electoral preferences.70 This finding is indicative of the information updating mechanism.
Successful information updating (which is facilitated by active information seeking and its
effect on information retention) triggers more extensive processing for informed issue voting
choices than for uninformed non-issue-based votes. Greater processing effort is also consistent
with priming: in the process of voting, the consideration of an issue that individuals perceive as
more relevant and salient (due to successful priming mediated by the effect of active
information seeking on information retention) should take more processing effort than a
scenario without successful priming.
Finally, note that the high-quality version of our treatment is also longer than the low-quality
version. Participants who fail to enter the central route of information processing might rely on
information length as a heuristic for information quality. However, our results clearly suggest
that the effects of the high-quality treatment on the more extensive use of information are
induced by information quality rather than length. This is because participants in the random
assignment condition who are assigned to the high-quality treatment do not exhibit an increased
use of information. If information length did constitute a heuristic for information quality,
greater issue voting should occur for this group of participants (who are not motivated to enter
the central route of information processing as a result of active information seeking). Yet the
effect does not occur for them: greater issue voting is reserved for individuals motivated by
information seeking to enter the central route, which shows that the effect on issue voting can
only be due to variation in information quality. Moreover, the effect in the active seeking
conditions compared to its absence in the random assignment condition also demonstrates the
value of a persuasion framework, which emphasizes the acceptance of information in addition
to its reception. Accepting information or rejecting it, as opposed to just receiving it more or less
easily, is critical for the connection between information behavior and the use of information. If
low-quality information was merely more difficult to receive, the random assignment condition
should show the same effect as the active seeking conditions.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Citizens will consider policy issues to form their political preferences when they actively seek
and find high-quality information about these issues. Our research shows that greater attention
to political issues depends critically on active information behavior and the provision of high-
quality information. We investigate the connection between information behavior, information
quality and political preferences by studying in a laboratory experiment the extent to which
German voters relied on information about the European integration issue to cast their votes in
the 2014 EP elections. The increased issue voting we observed stems from information seeking
itself rather than the factors that determine whether voters will seek information in the first
place. Our confidence in this matter is based on a novel experimental design that isolates
information behavior as an activity from the individual proclivities for selective information
exposure. To determine the effect of active information seeking on issue voting, the experiment
combines random assignment to information with the option of self-selection and a model of the
70 Processing duration of the PTV battery used for the dependent variable was significantly increased by about
1 second per party for information-seeking individuals with high-quality information (demographics from
Table 1 balanced).
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selection process, as well as a third condition of steered selection that makes individuals believe
they are actively choosing between different kinds of information even though they are not.
In addition to assuring internal validity through the use of an innovative experimental design
and its implementation in a laboratory setting, our research also exhibits a high degree of
external validity that considerably surpasses the typical lab experiment. Our claim to external
validity is based on using a diverse sample of participants, a realistic information environment,
real political parties, the context of a real election campaign and a real issue.71 The unique
features of the issue (that is, the vagueness, low overall variance and high within-party variation
of party positions about the Europeanization of employment policy) allow us to effectively
simulate the real-world political process of voter reactions to policy information in the
experiment. Real-world party positions on controversial issues are typically clear, which is why
such issues cannot be subjected to random assignment of party positions. At the same time, the
employment policy issue is salient at the voter level and thus yields meaningful responses. The
combination of internal validity and experimental realism guarantees that our conclusions based
on this unique issue can be extrapolated to political issues overall.
Our perspective on voters and their ability to meaningfully process issue information is an
optimistic one, because we show that citizens can be motivated to incorporate new information
about actual political issues into their voting calculus. Whether they do this or not, however,
depends on a political environment that fosters meaningful vote choices and the expression
of reasoned political preferences rooted in issue considerations by providing high-quality
information and interactive ways to engage that information. Our findings suggest that the
dismissing of policy information is the result of communication strategies of parties and
candidates that may well be highly professional and optimally framed in relation to a particular
socio-demographic target, yet frequently of deplorable quality and based on a perception of
voters as passive consumers rather than active seekers and participants. Contrary to this
perspective, our finding of a positive effect of actively sought high-quality information on the
extent of issue voting shows that voters react sympathetically when they are encouraged to seek
information and when information providers take them (and their ability to process information)
seriously.
Political competition in the real world is often far from this scenario. The country in which
we conducted our study, Germany, is a prime example of limited competitiveness through the
emergence of catch-all party politics on the left and the ‘social democratization’ of the right.
The relative harmonization of parties’ policy positions extends to the entire range of issues, but
may best be exemplified by the near absence of conflict over European integration, a fact that
we exploited for our experimental manipulation. In the United States, by contrast, increasing
competitiveness through rising rhetorical radicalism and polarization along partisan lines
coincides with the simultaneous decline in real political competition stemming from recurrent
gerrymandering and the unparalleled rise in the number of ‘safe’ and de facto uncontested
electoral districts.
Both overly and insufficiently competitive politics arguably reduce voters’ motivation to seek
information as a rational basis for their vote choices, by decreasing the significance of votes and
issue considerations in less competitive environments, and by drawing voters to rely on partisan
71 In this context, our null finding for passive information acquisition should not be overinterpreted. We
deliberately chose a conservative design to improve external validity, but scenarios with a larger general effect of
information on issue voting are certainly conceivable. Similarly, using much larger samples would help with
small effects such as those of low-quality information. By contrast, using a less trustworthy frame than that of a
national VAA would arguably contain the effect.
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labels when the political context is excessively competitive. Our study finds that information
seeking improves the impact of issue information on voting, but for active information behavior
to take place, it requires not only high-quality information and interactive approaches to
political discourse, but also a political environment that motivates voters to seek information in
the first place. A moderately competitive political environment not only encourages voters to
seek political information, it also makes it more likely that they will acquire information from
more varied sources and be less constrained by partisan bias. By contrast, excessive competition
decreases the occurrence of defection from more rigid partisan affiliations based on issues,
while a lack of competition offers few incentives for voters to look beyond easily acquired
partisan labels. Our study tries to disentangle selective exposure from information behavior to
isolate the impact of information seeking on issue voting. Importantly, by raising the degree to
which information is considered for vote choices, active seeking reinforces any positive effect
of political contextual changes affecting selective exposure. Actively seeking and finding
information of high quality thus enhances not only the quality of political discourse. It may also
function as an antidote to partisan polarization.
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